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Abstract
Firms are usually better informed than tax authorities about mar-
ket conditions and the potential proﬁts of competitors. They may try
to exploit this situation by under-reporting their own taxable proﬁts.
The tax authority could oﬀset ﬁrms' informational advantage by adopting
smarter audit policies  that take into account the relationship between
a ﬁrm's reported proﬁts and reports for the industry as a whole. Such
an audit policy will create an externality for the decision makers in the
industry and this externality can be expected to aﬀect not only ﬁrms'
reporting policies but also their market decisions. If public policy takes
into account wider economic issues than just revenue raising what is the
appropriate way for a tax authority to run such an audit policy? We
develop some clear policy rules in a standard model of an industry and
show the eﬀect of these rules using simulations.
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1 Introduction
Should a tax authority take into account the real-economy eﬀects of its com-
pliance policy? The actions of tax authorities are often perceived in purely
ﬁnancial terms, perhaps as a kind of tax farmer that seeks to maximise the
revenue for the government or as a ﬁscal police oﬃcer that seeks to ensure en-
forcement of the law as eﬀectively as possible. However, just as a conventional
police force may properly have objectives other than simple law enforcement
(fostering good community relations for example) so the tax authority may be
required to have concern for a broader range of economic objectives than simple
revenue-raising and compliance. Although it is convenient as a modelling device
to assume that an agency has a single ﬁnancial target it would be unreasonable
to insist that the government's diﬀerent policy objectives were located in sep-
arate watertight compartments. In this paper we suppose that a sensible tax
authority is concerned about issues of productive eﬃciency in the economy and
about equitable treatment of taxpayers. We develop a model of tax compliance
by ﬁrms and show how their activity in product markets is connected with the
design and implementation of enforcement policy by a tax agency.
Some aspects of the real-economy issues associated with tax compliance are
already well known. For example in the case of the personal income tax and
decisions made in the labour market the conventional Allingham and Sandmo
(1972) model can be extended to incorporate labour supply. The conventional
welfare-economic analysis of deadweight loss as applied to income taxes and com-
modity taxes can be extended to take tax noncompliance into account (Cowell,
1990). However the further considerations that apply in the case of the taxation
of ﬁrms have not been worked out. The case of ﬁrms is special in terms of both
the eﬃciency and equity objectives .
First, the eﬃciency considerations arise from the interaction among ﬁrms
within an industry as well as interaction of ﬁrms with the tax authority. Bayer
and Cowell (2009) have demonstrated that the eﬀectiveness of compliance policy
depends on whether there is eﬀective competition or collusion among the ﬁrms in
the industry.1 The interrelation between market organisation and the design of
compliance policy raises several policy questions. Should audit rules be designed
in such a way that ﬁrms will be induced to act more eﬃciently in product
markets? Should a change in industry competitiveness change the design of
compliance policy?
Second, the equity considerations arise precisely from the tailored audit rules
that the tax-authority might employ to induce the behaviour in product markets
that might be desirable on eﬃciency grounds. A smart compliance policy may
give the appearance of treating equals unequally in a way that does not arise
in compliance models involving the personal income tax. This implies that in
evaluating the desirability of compliance policy one needs to go beyond the
conventional individualistic welfare model in order to deal with questions of tax
equity.
1See also Besfamille et al. (2009) who show that with imperfectly competitive ﬁrms in-
creased enforcement of an output tax will reduce output and may reduce revenue.
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The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 explains our approach and
relates it to the literature and Section 3 sets out the formal model. Section 4
develops the simple welfare-analytics of this model examines its workings using
a simulation; Section 5 discusses the special issues of equitable treatment that
occur in the audit model with ﬁrms; Section 6 draws the policy implications
from this. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Approach
2.1 Setting
Before we specify the precise model that we shall use to establish results and to
simulate behaviour let us describe the economic agents and their interrelation-
ships.
Firms. In some treatments of the economics of tax compliance ﬁrms are
treated as no more than proﬁt centres which can be tapped by the tax agency.
More sophisticated approaches take some account of the ﬁrms' role as producers
but in a naive fashion that does not yield much economic insight. The stan-
dard assumption is either that each ﬁrm is a price-taker without market power
or that there is a perfectly-informed monopolist with almost complete market
power. However, under conventional treatment of risk and taxation, each of
these idealised market forms turns out to produce an analysis of tax evasion
in which the ﬁrms' characteristics are eﬀectively absent:2because each ﬁrm is
assumed to be in a particularly simple market environment, particularly simple
results emerge.
To make the analysis interesting we need to think of the ﬁrm also as an
information processor. This involves analysing the behaviour of the ﬁrm under
uncertainty. The uncertainty comes from three sources:
1. exogenous uncertainty, such as demand shocks, cost shocks and assessment
errors
2. uncertainty as to whether the ﬁrm will be audited for tax purposes,
3. uncertainty about the behaviour of other ﬁrms in a similar position to
itself.
All three types of uncertainty will be seen to have a role within our model.
The third type makes it clear that it is important to consider the ﬁrm within
the context of an industry where the behaviour of other ﬁrms is important in
determining its own behaviour.
2What happens is that under these special market conditions the production decisions can
eﬀectively be separated out from the tax compliance decisions, reducing the tax-compliance
problem to a minor elaboration of the Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model (Cowell, 2004,
Lee, 1998). For alternative approaches see Etro (1998), Bayer and Cowell (2009).
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Industry. What is an industry? Our model of an industry focuses not so much
on the physical characteristics of the outputs of the member ﬁrms but on the
relationship among them. In the light of the exogenous uncertainty mentioned
as point 1 in the list above it makes sense to suppose that members of the
industry are better-informed than other economic agents about market events
that may aﬀect their proﬁts: they intimately know the economic conditions that
apply to their industry and could, if they wanted to, make reasonable estimates
of the performance of other industry members. In a sense the industry is an
information network in which the insiders have an advantage over an outside
observer such as the tax authority. If there were no information advantage
then the tax authority could work out the proﬁt-maximising decisions and the
associated industry equilibrium for itself and audits would become virtually
irrelevant. To keep the problem manageable we assume that the industry is
assumed to have a ﬁxed number of ﬁrms: we do not attempt to account for
entry into or exit from the industry. In our formal model it is suﬃcient to let
the number of ﬁrms be 2, although this simpliﬁcation is not essential to the
main point of the argument.
Tax authority. We suppose that tax policy is entrusted to an agency that
has the responsibility for enforcement, control over audit policy, and, possibly,
over tax design but not over the structure or level of penalties for illegal non-
compliance (evasion). Its objectives may be wider than simple revenue raising:
this is important in our discussion of eﬃciency and policy design in Section 4.
The tax authority will expect to ﬁnd that diﬀerent types of audit policy will
have diﬀerent types of impact on the ﬁrms' behaviour. Once again the role of
information is crucial because, although the tax authority will not have as good
information about an industry as the insiders it will ﬁnd that there is some
information that can be used to reﬁne and improve the audit policy.
Policy evaluation. We assume that the tax authority is answerable to a
government that cares about the well-being of its citizens. Accordingly policy
can be evaluated in terms of welfare-economic criteria that are applied as stan-
dard to other problems of public policy evaluation such as cost-beneﬁt analysis.
3 Model
We begin with the factors that determine the ﬁrms' taxable capacity. We repre-
sent the industry as a duopoly. The essential insights can easily be extended to
an arbitrary number of heterogeneous ﬁrms: the two-ﬁrm model just requires
some interpretation: if we focus on the behaviour of ﬁrm 1 then ﬁrm 2 can be
considered as a proxy for the rest of the industry in the eyes of ﬁrm 1's decision
makers.
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3.1 Firms and industry
We assume that ﬁrms make decisions about quantities of a good to produce and
sell in a market. Each ﬁrm's market opportunities are given by a linear inverse
demand schedule:
p(q1 + q2) := 1− q1 − q2, (1)
where p is the the market price of the industry's output given that ﬁrm 1 and
ﬁrm 2 supply quantities q1 and q2 to the market. If K1 (·) and K2 (·) are the
production-cost functions of ﬁrms 1 and 2 respectively, then pre-tax proﬁts are
Π1 (q1, q2) = p(q1 + q2)q1 −K1 (q1) , (2)
Π2 (q1, q2) = p(q1 + q2)q2 −K2 (q2) . (3)
In the standard industrial-organisation model this is almost the end of the story.
There remains a type of endogenous uncertainty for each ﬁrm about the output
decisions of the other; this is usually resolved within a standard game-theoretic
framework to capture the type of relationship between the economic agents in
the industry; here we take each of two apparently standard cases:
• Cournot : each ﬁrm takes the other's output as ﬁxed while solving its own
proﬁt-maximisation problem.
• Collusion: the ﬁrms act jointly in their decision making.
However, this is not almost the end of the story and, in the present context,
these two cases are not quite the standard ones of the industrial-organisation
literature. As we will discuss in Section 3.2, the introduction of taxation and the
possibility of non-compliance introduce new elements to the proﬁt-maximisation
problem.
3.2 Tax regimes and (non-)compliance
Assume that the ﬁrms' proﬁts Π1, Π2 are the basis for taxation. The tax au-
thority is aware that ﬁrms may perceive that their information about the proﬁts
that they make in a given year is better than the tax authority's information
and that this may give them to under-report or to conceal. If the tax is propor-
tional at rate t and there is full compliance by the ﬁrm then the ﬁrms' proﬁts,
net of taxes, are simply
[1− t] Π1 (q1, q2) , (4)
[1− t] Π2 (q1, q2) . (5)
However, these proﬁts are not directly observable by the tax authority without
incurring the cost. Instead it receives declarations d1, d2 from each of the two
ﬁrms and it may choose to undertake a costly audit in order to check the truth-
fulness of the report. If a ﬁrm is found to have under-reported, it is required to
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make up the shortfall of the tax and also to pay a ﬁne F . The size of the ﬁne
is assumed to be outside the jurisdiction of the tax authority  we will assume
it to be a ﬁxed proportion of the under-reported proﬁt, Πi − di for ﬁrm i.
Even with the presence of the ﬁne, less than complete compliance may still
be an attractive option for a ﬁrm, as discussed in section 3.3. How the ﬁrm may
be expected to react will depend on the type of audit policy in place and the
consequent probability of being subjected to a ﬁne. We assume that the ﬁrms
are well informed about the audit strategy being used by the tax authority
although not about how it will be applied in their own case. In other words
all in the industry know how the probability of auditing individual ﬁrms is
determined but no ﬁrm knows for sure that it will be audited. Clearly there
is a wide range of possibilities for the structure of audits in the light of ﬁrms'
behaviour. However, we will focus on just two types of audit policy that are,
perhaps, useful caricatures of actual practice and that enable us to analyse the
role of information.
Fixed audit rule. The simplest type of audit rule is one where it is common
knowledge that there is a given probability β0i that ﬁrm i will be audited during
the year: the probability does not depend on the reports d1, d2. We will use
this primitive type of policy as a benchmark.
The relative rule. If the tax authority wants to make use of the imperfect
information it has about the industry it could use this to tailor the audit rule for
each individual ﬁrm in the light of that ﬁrm's declaration relative to declarations
generally in the industry. The reports from each ﬁrm are free information and
we can imagine the situation where an intelligent tax authority would use this
to ﬂag suspicious behaviour. If there were many similar ﬁrms in the industry
the tax authority might well concentrate its investigations on individual ﬁrms
reporting substantially below the industry average. In our two-ﬁrm case this
translates into a rule where, ceteris paribus, one always assigns a higher audit
probability to the ﬁrm reporting the lower proﬁt. In the case where ﬁrms 1 and
2 are indeed similar it is instructive to look at the linear relative audit rule that
generates detection probabilities
β1(d1, d2) = a+ b [d2 − d1] , (6)
β2(d2, d1) = a+ b [d1 − d2] , (7)
where a and b are policy parameters. Parameter a reﬂects the total audit eﬀort
by the authority and is determined by its budget: it is the average detection
probability for any pattern of declarations by the two ﬁrms. Parameter b cap-
tures the authority's reactivity: the higher is b the higher is the probability
penalty for declaring low proﬁts. To ensure that βi is not negative and is not
greater than 1 we require b ≤ a/Πmax, where Πmax is the Cournot proﬁt. Clearly
the special case of the ﬁxed audit rule where β01 = β
0
2 = a can be taken as the
limiting form of the relative rule.
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3.3 The ﬁrm and its behaviour
We assume that ﬁrms are concerned just about expected net proﬁts. If the ﬁrms
declare d1 ≤ Π1 and d2 ≤ Π2 but are not audited, then their after-tax proﬁts
are, respectively,
pi1 (d1, q1, q2) := Π1 (q1, q2)− td1, (8)
pi2 (d2, q1, q2) := Π2 (q1, q2)− td2. (9)
If they are audited then, on the assumption that the audit immediately uncovers
the true value of taxable proﬁts, the ﬁrms' proﬁts after the tax and ﬁne are,
respectively,
pi1 (d1, q1, q2) := Π1 (q1, q2)− td1 − f [Π1 (q1, q2)− d1] , (10)
pi2 (d2, q1, q2) := Π2 (q1, q2)− td2 − f [Π2 (q1, q2)− d2] . (11)
where f is the proportionate ﬁne rate, which is assumed to exceed t, such that
the payment after a successful audit at least covers the evaded taxes.
There is one other element to the problem for which we have not yet allowed.
Eﬀective under-reporting, that is, ﬁrms' activities leave trails in the product
market and elsewhere. Simply reporting proﬁts that are manifestly inconsistent
with these evidence trails is not credible so that some sort of explicit concealment
activity needs to be involved. This activity is costly and we may reasonably
suppose the marginal concealment cost to be increasing in the amount being
concealed. Accordingly we let the cost of concealment be represented as
Ci := [Πi (q1, q2)− di]2 (12)
for i = 1, 2. Drawing together expressions (6) to (12) this means that the
expected payoﬀs for the two ﬁrms, net of concealment costs, are
β1(d1, d2)pi1 (d1, q1, q2) + [1− β1(d1, d2)]pi1 (d1, q1, q2)− C1(Π1 (q1, q2)− d1),
(13)
β2(d1, d2)pi2 (d1, q1, q2)+[1− β2(d1, d2)]pi2 (d1, q1, q2)−C2(Π2 (q1, q2)−d2) (14)
3.4 Workings of the model
As we noted above, there is rather more to this analysis than a conventional
quantity-setting oligopoly. Each ﬁrm has two control variables q1 and d1 for
ﬁrm 1, q2 and d2 for ﬁrm 2. Each ﬁrm is directly aﬀected by the choices made
by the other. The ﬁrm's activities are carried out in two stages:
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• production stage: This covers the generation of taxable proﬁt and includes
production and sales of the product. In the model ﬁrms choose q1, q2.
• declaration stage: This concerns the ﬁnancial decisions made by the ﬁrms:
they choose d1, d2.
Although we reasonably imagine the declaration stage as being after the pro-
duction stage, of course the decisions and expected outcomes in the second stage
will feed back into decisions made in the ﬁrst stage. Therefore we can expect
that policy instruments that focus on the second-stage ﬁnancial decisions may
have repercussions also on the real economy decisions in the ﬁrst stage. Fur-
thermore, between the production stage and the declaration stage each ﬁrm may
experience a proﬁt shock, which is observable to the ﬁrms in the industry but
unobservable to the tax authority. Because the quantities q1, q2 have already
been chosen at the point when the shock occurs, proﬁt shocks that result from
ﬁxed-cost shocks, marginal-cost shocks, demand shocks or observation errors by
the tax authority can all be expressed in the same way. We assume that the
ﬁrms are essentially identical except for the proﬁt shock; in particular they are
perceived ex ante as identical by the tax authority when determining its audit
rule.
The two stages and the two contrasting market assumptions, Cournot com-
petition or collusion, lead us to consider four possible cases, which we will brieﬂy
consider in turn.
Case 1: Cournot competition at both ﬁrst and second stages.
Here the tax authority has a nice opportunity. Consider the standard model of a
symmetric duopoly illustrated in Figure 1 where the two straight lines represent
the reaction functions of the two ﬁrms. If ﬁrms were perfectly compliant on
principle, or if the tax authority could perfectly observe market events so that
there were no possibility of evasion, then equilibrium would be at point
(
qC1 , q
C
2
)
(we have qC1 = q
C
2 by symmetry). If the tax authority cannot observe events
perfectly and just uses a ﬁxed audit rule then this does not aﬀect the product
market so that the reaction functions and equilibrium remain unaltered Marrelli
and Martina (1988)In our model this is the case when b, the reactivity of the
rule in (6, 7), is zero. Then ﬁrms face a declaration-independent detection
probability of a. However, if the authority switches to a relative rule it creates
an informational externality: each ﬁrm knows that its probability of audit is
going to depend on its declaration relative to the average declaration in the
industry. Two things then happen. First, the switch to the relative rule causes
each ﬁrm to increase the declaration for any given level of output, for reasons
that are straightforward to see intuitively. The reactivity of the relative rule is
of special importance here.
Proposition 1 In a symmetric equilibrium the rule's reactivity b decreases the
amount of taxes evaded.
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Figure 1: Eﬀect on reaction function of informational externality
Proof. See appendix.
Second, there is an eﬀect on the ﬁrst-stage reaction curves in Figure 1. To
see this note that an increase in ﬁrm one's quantity q1 in generally cause the
proﬁts of ﬁrm 2 to fall, which in turn reduces the optimal declaration of ﬁrm 2.
Therefore, ﬁrm one can indirectly decrease its audit probability by increasing
its production quantity. A ﬁrm wants to do this up to the point where the own
gross proﬁt reduction of a further increase in q1 outweighs the improved scope
for evasion. By this reasoning we can see that the switch in the audit regime will
move ﬁrm 1's reaction function out to the right as shown. Of course the same
eﬀect works for ﬁrm 2 and so it is clear that equilibrium output must increase.3
We can state this positive eﬀect of a relative rule on the quantity choices
more formally.
Proposition 2 Under a ﬁxed rule (b = 0) in equilibrium ﬁrms produce the
Cournot quantity, while under a relative rule they produce more than the Cournot
quantity.
Proof. See appendix.
3.4.1 Case 2: Cournot competition at the ﬁrst stage, collusion at
the second stage.
If ﬁrms are able to cooperate on tax returns then it is clear that they will aim at
eliminating the externality introduced by a relative audit rule. By coordinating
3The result is general and does not depend on either the assumption that there are only
two ﬁrms or the assumption of linear reaction functions (Bayer and Cowell, 2009).
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their declarations they can avoid the dilemma that both ﬁrms have an incentive
to increase their declarations in order to reduce the audit probability. Conse-
quently, in the case of collusion at the declaration stage, a relative rule loses its
positive eﬀect on declared proﬁts and declarations become the same as under
a ﬁxed rule (i.e. the reactivity of the rule b is zero).4 Consequently, increasing
the reactivity of the rule does not help to reduce evasion.
Proposition 3 If ﬁrms collude on the declaration stage then in a symmetric
equilibrium the reactivity of the rule b has no impact on the evaded tax.
Proof. See appendix.
Obviously, this raises the question how collusion at the declaration stage
impacts on production decisions. The impact is not obvious. One might expect
that eliminating the externality of the relative rule on the second stage also takes
away any incentive to produce more than the Cournot quantity. Or even worse,
one could conjecture that the collusion at the second stage might spill over to the
production stage leading to quantities even smaller than those under Cournot
competition. Luckily, these fears are unsubstantiated. Cooperation among ﬁrms
when they ﬁle their tax returns does not fully eliminate the externality on
production quantities created by a relative rule. The intuition is subtle. When
ﬁrms individually decide on their production quantities they foresee already
that they will collude on the declaration stage later on. The jointly optimal
declarations will depend on the gross proﬁts. As in the case without collusion
ﬁrm i's optimal declaration (now the one that maximises joint ex-post expected
proﬁt) increases with ﬁrm j′s gross proﬁt. For this reason  with the ultimate
outcome in mind  a ﬁrm wants to reduce the proﬁt of the competitor by
increasing production even when it knows that they will cooperate when ﬁling
the tax returns.
Proposition 4 If ﬁrms collude on the declaration stage then a relative rule
(b > 0) still leads to quantities greater than the Cournot quantity.
Proof. See appendix.
A relative rule loses its beneﬁcial eﬀect on evasion behaviour in the presence
of collusive tax declarations but still delivers welfare gains in the product market
through production quantities beyond the Cournot outcome.
3.4.2 Case 3: Collusion at the ﬁrst stage, competition at the second
stage.
Suppose the ﬁrms can agree on total output and some allocation of output and
proﬁt between them. Since ﬁrms are identical ex ante, assume further that they
4This is true in a symmetric environment, where both ﬁrms have the same production
and evasion cost. In asymmetric situations the declarations may diﬀer from the ﬁxed rule
outcome, as collusion provides an additional incentive to minimise aggregate evasion cost.
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can only agree on quotas that lead to the same gross proﬁt for both.5 Once
the gross proﬁts are realised the ﬁrms independently declare proﬁts. Here the
relative audit rule is obviously still eﬀective in reducing the amount of taxes
evaded compared to a ﬁxed rule, as the externality stemming from the relative
rule is still on operation in the declaration stage.
Proposition 5 In a symmetric equilibrium with collusion at the declaration
stage the rule's reactivity b decreases the amount of taxes evaded
Proof. Analogous to the proof of Proposition 1.
It remains to be determined, which production quantities the ﬁrms will agree
upon on the ﬁrst stage. Intuition suggests that the relative rule operating on
the second stage does not play a role. Since ex-post expected net proﬁts should
increase with the gross proﬁts ﬁrms should be able to agree on a joint monopoly
production plan. The following Proposition conﬁrms this intuition.
Proposition 6 Duopolists that can enforce a cartel agreement with identical
quotas produce half the monopoly quantity each.
Proof. See appendix.
3.4.3 Case 4: Collusion at both stages.
It is clear that this combination results eﬀectively in monopoly behaviour through-
out; the distinction between the stages becomes artiﬁcial as does the distinction
between the two types of audit rule. Under fairly weak conditions (e.g. symmet-
ric cartel agreements) we know that output and declaration decisions become
independent (Lee, 1998).6 If ﬁrms behave like one large proﬁt maximising entity
with respect to both production and declaration decisions then a relative rule
loses all bite. It is worth noting that a relative rule at least does no harm in
this highly collusive environment.
4 Audit policy
In the light of the diverse behaviour that will arise from auditor-ﬁrm interaction
under various competitive regimes there are some important policy implications
to be investigated. We will do this in two stages in order to separate out pure
eﬃciency objectives from equity considerations: ﬁrst we will examine the case
where the proﬁt shock is vanishingly small so that the ﬁrms necessarily appear
to the tax authority as identical if they make identical choices; then, in section
5 we will consider the impact of the proﬁt shock.
In what follows we use a simulation to analyse how relative audit rules aﬀect
revenue, quantities and evasion cost.
5This could be the outcome of Nash bargaining with identical bargaining power and without
side payments.
6The proofs to Propositions 3 and 6, showing independence of declarations and quantities
from b if there is collusion on the respective stage, still go through.
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Figure 2: Quantities and revenue in equilibrium for diﬀerent t and b
4.1 Case 1 Cournot competition at both stages
We ﬁrst look at the non-collusion scenario, where we have established that a
relative rule increases tax declarations for given proﬁts, but also reduces proﬁts
by inducing higher production quantities, which in turn reduces declarations and
revenue. So the total eﬀect of a relative audit rule on revenue has two conﬂicting
components: a positive declaration eﬀect and a negative proﬁt eﬀect. The
declaration eﬀect is a ﬁrst-order eﬀect, while the proﬁt eﬀect is only of second
order. The declaration eﬀect is anticipated by ﬁrms at the quantity-choice stage
and production quantities are adapted accordingly. Thus, we can expect that a
more ﬂexible rule provides a double dividend, which consists of an increased
production quantity and an increased revenue. To investigate this we simulate
the two-stage game using the model of equations (1)-(14) and the assumption
that marginal production cost is a constant c.
First, if the authority uses a relative audit rule, what happens to output
and tax revenue as the sensitivity of the rule and the tax rate change? Figure
2 shows contour plots of the simulated equilibrium quantity and revenue for
c = 0.1, a = 0.25 and f = 0.5.7 A lighter shading indicates higher values of the
quantities and government revenue, respectively.
It is apparent that a more reactive rule increases production quantities and
revenue for a given tax rate. The marginal quantity eﬀect of an increase in the
sensitivity is decreasing. The marginal revenue eﬀect of the audit sensitivity
increases with the tax rate. We see that a more reactive audit rule might lead
to higher welfare, as a higher reactivity does not lead to an apparent conﬂict
between the revenue and industry output. The tax rate has an inﬂuence on the
7The calculation of the equilibrium is tedious and is available on
http://darp.lse.ac.uk/taxcomplianceﬁrms
11
Figure 3: Waste and surplus
quantity only if the detection rule is relative. The tax rate and the sensitivity
are substitutes for generating higher outputs if b > 0.
For a partial-equilibrium welfare analysis we assume that the social welfare
function places equal weight on consumer surplus CS, producer surplus and
the revenue available for producing public goods. Then total surplus can be
expressed as:
total surplus = CS + pi1(d
∗
1, d
∗
2, q
∗
1 , q
∗
2) + pi2(d
∗
1, d
∗
2, q
∗
1 , q
∗
2) + revenue
=
ˆ q∗1+q∗2
0
[p(x)− c] dx− [C1(d∗1 −Π1(q∗1 , q∗2)) + C2(d∗1 −Π2(q∗1 , q∗2))]︸ ︷︷ ︸
waste
.
Figure 3 shows how the wasted resources (due to evasion activity) and the
overall surplus depend on the tax rate and on the reactivity of the rule. Lighter
shading again represents higher values. We see that a higher tax rate increases
the waste, as it provides a higher evasion incentive. Since the evasion incentive
is reduced by the reactivity of the rule, waste is reduced by an increase in b.
With respect to the surplus it is apparent that again a high reactivity is
helpful. Overall welfare increases for a given tax rate with b. However, the
impact of the tax rate is non-monotonic. On the one hand a relative rule works
best at increasing output if the tax is high. The externality on production is
the higher the more severe the consequences of evasion are, since the tax rate
increases the stakes. On the other hand, a high tax rate increases evasion and
therefore the evasion cost: the increased concealment investment represents a
waste for the economy. We conclude that for every level of reactivity, there is a
tax rate that maximises welfare. Note that the upper left corner of the graph
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Figure 4: Surplus under collusion
(with the highest waste and low surplus but downward-sloping contours) is the
region where ﬁrms go underground and declare zero proﬁt.
4.2 Cases 2 and 3: Partial collusion
We have seen so far that welfare increases with the reactivity of the rule if we
assume that ﬁrms do not collude. Figure 4 shows the total surplus for symmetric
equilibria, when the ﬁrms collude on the declaration or the production stage.8
The chosen parameters are the same as above. It is apparent that increasing the
reactivity of the relative rule is still welfare enhancing despite of the presence
of collusion at one of the stages. In both cases, collusion removes one beneﬁcial
element of a relative rule. If ﬁrms collude on the declaration stage then the
externality that reduces evasion (and thus waste) is internalised, while the in-
centive to produce more than under a ﬁxed rule is preserved, as increasing the
quantity improves a ﬁrm's position in the following collusive declaration stage.
In the case of collusion at the production stage the relative rule has no impact
on the quantities produced, as the ﬁrms choose jointly gross-proﬁt maximis-
ing quantities. The remaining beneﬁcial consequence of a relative rule is the
reduction in evasion and wasted resources.9
8Graphs for quantities, revenues, etc. for the collusion scenarios can be found on
http://darp.lse.ac.uk/taxcomplianceﬁrms
9In the panel for collusion on the declaration stage we again have full evasion in the area
where the contours are downwards sloping.
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5 Reactivity and inequity
We have seen that increasing the reactivity of the relative rule has a positive
eﬀect on eﬃciency. In this section we investigate if there are adverse distributive
eﬀects related to a high reactivity. In what follows we will set up an environment
where ex-ante identical ﬁrms may end up with diﬀerent gross proﬁts due to some
external shocks, which cannot be observed by the authority. The proﬁt shocks
result in the ex-ante identical ﬁrms becoming diﬀerent observationally. The tax
authority does not observe the shock and still believes that ﬁrms are essentially
identical. Consequently, the authority attributes any declaration diﬀerences
between ﬁrms to diﬀerences in the ﬁrms evasion activities. Applying a relative
rule then is intended to punish the ﬁrm that tries to evade more. However, in
the case when diﬀerences in declaration actually result from good or bad luck
(i.e. the realisation of the proﬁt shock) then the relative rule punishes the ﬁrm
who had a bad draw, while it rewards the ﬁrm that was lucky. The reactivity of
the rule might be positively related to the degree of unfairness created by the
relative rule.10
To develop this argument, we ﬁrst set up a simple version of shocks within
our model and outline the resulting equilibrium (section 5.1). We then investi-
gate how the reactivity of the rule inﬂuences allocations and examine whether
the reactivity of the rule appears to produce an inequitable outcome (sections
5.2 and 5.3). We make the background assumption that the nominal tax sys-
tem reﬂects fairness and investigate the impact of the relative rule on diﬀerent
fairness criteria. Showing that our result holds for multiple measures provides
a robustness check. The fairness criteria we use are linked to diﬀerent distribu-
tional measures such as relative tax burden, relative proﬁt after taxes, relative
monetary expected net proﬁt after audits and the relative total expected net
proﬁt including evasion cost. While we show that the reactivity of the rule has
a negative impact on fairness, it is important to note that the positive eﬀect of
an increased reactivity on welfare survives the modiﬁcation to our basic model.
An eﬃciency-equity trade-oﬀ arises.
5.1 Shocks and unequal proﬁts
Denote the interim gross proﬁt of the ﬁrms by:
Π˜i(qi, qj , κi) := Πi(qi, qj) + κi, i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j. (15)
where (κ1, κ2) are random proﬁt shocks for the two ﬁrms with known probability
density function ϕ. Because ﬁrms are identical ex ante we require the shock
distribution to be symmetrical so that
ϕ(A,B) = ϕ(B,A).
10Another way of thinking about this is that it is a measur of the ineﬃciency of the tax
authorities audit rule, whereby they invest public resources in investigating the wrong ﬁrms,
those with lower concealed proﬁts.
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This restriction ensures that if, say, A represents a large negative shock, while
B is small, then both ﬁrms have the same probability of being the ﬁrm that
suﬀers the large shock.
For each possible combination of interim gross proﬁts of the two ﬁrms there
starts a declaration subgame: the subgame-perfect continuation is a pair of dec-
larations for each possible pair of interim proﬁts. The rule for translating interim
proﬁts into optimal declarations can be derived from the following maximisation
problem.
d∗i
(
Π˜i, Π˜j
)
= arg max
di
EUi(di, dj , Π˜i, Π˜j), ∀i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j.
In the case of the model in Section 3, solving for the optimal declarations de-
pending on the interim proﬁts we have:
d∗i
(
Π˜i, Π˜j
)
=
af − t
2b+ f
+
2(1 + bf)
2 + 3bf
Π˜i +
bf
2 + 3bf
Π˜j . (16)
Through this decision rule a ﬁrm can foresee its expected net proﬁt for any
interim proﬁt pair. Denote the function that maps the interim proﬁts into an
expected equilibrium proﬁt by Ri(Π˜i, Π˜j) which, in view of (15), is a function of
q1, q2, κ1 and κ2.We now can compactly write down the ﬁrst-stage maximisation
problem of a ﬁrm:
q∗i = arg max
qi
ˆ ˆ
f(κi, κj) ·Ri(qi, qj , κi, κj)dκidκj , ∀i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j.
So, anticipating the declaration decision, a ﬁrm will choose the quantity that
maximises the expected net proﬁt for a given quantity of the other ﬁrm. The
expectation is taken over the possible realisations of the ﬁxed-cost shocks for
both ﬁrms. The explicit solution to this maximisation problem depends on the
distribution of the shocks. It is important to note that the decision problem
for both ﬁrms is identical, since the ﬁrms are identical ex ante (including the
symmetry of the shocks). Consequently, if there exists at least one pure-strategy
equilibrium then there is always a symmetrical equilibrium. Furthermore, if we
have a unique pure-strategy equilibrium than this is the symmetric one. For
simplicity we concentrate on symmetric pure-strategy equilibria. In such an
equilibrium both ﬁrms choose the same production quantity, i.e. q∗1 = q
∗
2 = q
∗.
As a consequence ﬁrms' interim proﬁts only diﬀer with respect to the reali-
sations of the ﬁxed-cost shocks:
∆Π˜ =
∣∣∣Π˜i − Π˜j∣∣∣ = |κi − κj | = ∆κ.
In what follows we use the ﬁndings from above in order to judge if according to
some criteria an increased reactivity has adverse eﬀects on equity considerations.
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5.2 Reactivity and the relative tax burden
A natural criterion for fairness is the relative tax burden. Taking the linear
proﬁt-tax scheme as the basis for fairness intentions by the legislator then a
ﬁrm that has one dollar more proﬁt than another should pay t dollar more in
taxes. So suppose that a cost shock has led to the two ﬁrms having interim
proﬁts, which diﬀer by ∆κ. Note that we know from above that the gross proﬁt
excluding the shocks are the same for both ﬁrms. Then we can use (16) in order
to calculate the diﬀerence in tax liabilitiest∆d after the declaration:
t∆d = t
2 + bf
2 + 3bf
∆κ. (17)
For a ﬁxed rule with b = 0 the diﬀerence between the tax bills is just equal
to the gross proﬁt diﬀerence multiplied by the tax rate. Therefore a ﬁxed rule
satisﬁes the criterion of fair relative tax burdens: a ﬁrm with one dollar more
in proﬁts pays t dollars more in taxes. The diﬀerence in (17) declines when
b increases. For a given situation and a given proﬁt diﬀerence an increase in
the reactivity of the rule has a potentially unwanted distributional side-eﬀect.
The proﬁt gap has a smaller impact on the diﬀerences in tax payments than
intended by the tax law. This favours the ﬁrm that by chance ended up with a
higher interim proﬁt. It will be able to exploit the relative rule, as the authority
directs more resources to the ﬁrm with the lower proﬁt, since that ﬁrm looks
more suspicious. Consequently, the ﬁrm will pay less than the intended 100t
cents more per dollar of extra proﬁt. The gap between the intended relative
tax burden and the eﬀective tax burden (before auditing takes place) widens
with the reactivity of the rule; it is straightforward to extend this analysis to
the diﬀerence in net proﬁts before auditing. The diﬀerence is
∆Π˜− t∆d =
(
1− t 2 + bf
2 + 3bf
)
∆κ,
where (1 − t)∆κ is intended by the legislator. The ﬁrm with the higher gross
proﬁt will enjoy a larger net proﬁt gap to the ﬁrm with the lower proﬁt than
intended whenever the rule has positive reactivity.
This advantage enjoyed by the ﬁrm with higher gross proﬁt suggests that
the tax treatment of the two ﬁrms could be regarded as unfair. What is more,
unlike the case with the taxation of personal incomes where individual taxpayers
probably do not know the incomes and tax assessments of other individuals,
in the case of ﬁrms it is reasonable to assume that ﬁrms know each others'
circumstances, know their competitors' proﬁts and may know how other ﬁrms
are being treated for tax purposes; the tax authority, although not able to
observe the circumstances and proﬁts of ﬁrms accurately will be aware that this
information is common knowledge within the industry and will thus be aware
that their audit policy may generate a perception of unfairness. Based on the
diﬀerence in net proﬁts (before audits take place) we can deﬁne an unfairness
measure capturing the relative advantage of a ﬁrm earning more than the other
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ﬁrm. Our ﬁrst measure φ1 takes the net proﬁt gap, normalises the underlying
gross proﬁt diﬀerence to one dollar and subtracts the fair gap of 1− t:
φ1 = t
(
1− 2+bf2+3bf
)
= 2bft2+3bf .
Clearly φ1 measures by how many dollars the resulting net proﬁt gap exceeds the
fair gap. More precisely φ1 measures the gap between the two ﬁrms' after tax
proﬁts per dollar of gross proﬁt diﬀerence over and above the gap intended by
tax law, which is 1− t. Unfairness according to this measure increases with the
reactivity of the rule. A ﬁxed rule (i.e. b = 0) does not result in any unfairness,
as φ1 becomes zero in that case. For a given positive reactivity distributional
unfairness increases with the tax rate.
5.3 Reactivity and relative expected net payoﬀ after au-
diting
We have seen that the ﬁrm with a coincidentally higher gross proﬁt can ex-
ploit the fact that the relative rule does not take this coincidence into account
and therefore considers this ﬁrm as less suspicious. Does this unfair advan-
tage prevail if we take into account that the lucky ﬁrm will have to pay higher
ﬁnes if caught. The intended diﬀerence in expected net proﬁt after auditing
∆Π˜− t∆d−∆EF, where ∆EF denotes the expected ﬁne, can be calculated as
∆Π˜− t∆d−∆EF =
(
1− t 2+bf2+3bf + 2bf(2af−t)2+3bf
)
∆κ
= bf(3−4af+t)+2(1−t)2+3bf ∆κ
Taking the same approach from above and expressing the gap per monetary
unit and normalising by subtracting the fair gap we get a measure for the unfair
advantage of the more proﬁtable ﬁrm for the expected post audit proﬁt:
φ2 =
4b(t− af)
2 + 3fb
.
The diﬀerence between φ2 and φ1 is that φ2 takes into account two additional
factors, the higher ﬁne the richer ﬁrm has to pay if caught but also the reduced
audit probability of the richer ﬁrm stemming from a higher declaration than that
of the less proﬁtable ﬁrm. This wider deﬁnition of fairness leaves our qualitative
result from above unchanged. As for our ﬁrst measure a ﬁxed rule (b = 0) does
not lead to unfairness, since then the expected proﬁt gap (including auditing
and ﬁnes) is exactly 1− t as intended by the legislator; φ2 is equal to zero. The
proﬁt gap increases with b.11 So also if expected net proﬁt after an audit is the
criterion an authority adheres to when it comes to fairness then the reactivity
of the rule has a negative impact on distributional fairness. The higher $b$ the
11To see this take ∂φ2/∂b and note that this derivative is positive if t > af , which is the
condition for evasion taking place.
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larger is the deviation from the intended net proﬁt diﬀerence of 1− t per dollar.
As with φ1 the tax rate is positively related to distributional unfairness if the
rule is relative.
Reactivity and fairness when evasion cost are considered
Typically, one would expect that authorities are not too concerned about ﬁrms'
costs that arise only from evasion activity. In the present case it might make
sense though, since including the evasion cost provides a good robustness check
of our qualitative results. A higher reactivity of the audit rule increases al-
locative eﬃciency but might cause some distributional concerns, as we have
discussed. The distributional inequity comes from the fact that a relative rule
does not take into account unobserved proﬁt diﬀerences. Hence, a ﬁrm with a
coincidentally higher proﬁt has an advantage, since the rule treats the higher
declaration as a sign of the ﬁrm evading less, whereas it is rather a sign of the
ﬁrm having a higher proﬁt. The ﬁrm can exploit this by evading more taxes.
With evading more taxes the ﬁrm will also have to incur higher real resource
cost arising from the evasion activity. These costs are not included in either
of the two measures we investigated previously. Here we ask if the reactivity
of the rule still leads to distributional concerns if we take into account evasion
costs. So we are interested in the diﬀerence of total equilibrium net proﬁts of
two ﬁrms who accidentally ended up with diﬀerent payoﬀs ∆EU . We construct
the unfairness measure φ3 that includes the evasion cost in the same way as
above (normalising M κ to one and subtracting the fair gap 1− t ):
φ3 =
f(1 + bf)
(2 + bf)
4b(t− af)
(2 + 3bf)
.
Measure φ3 is closely related to φ2, as it only diﬀers by a factor of f(1 +
bf)/(2 + bf). Not surprisingly, also for this measure a ﬁxed audit rule does not
lead to any distributional distortions, since φ3 = 0 for b = 0. However, even
if one takes into account the evasion cost an increase in the reactivity leads to
greater unfairness, since φ3 increases in b
∂φ3
∂b
=
4f(4 + bf(8 + 5b)(t− af)
(2 + bf)2(2 + 3bf)2
> 0 for t > af,
where t > af is the condition for evasion to take place.12 As for the other
measures, for a given positive b an increase in the tax rate increases unfairness.
6 Policy
Some policy consequences are clear. In the absence of shocks a government that
wants to maximise welfare should set the reactivity to its maximum level. This
12If the evasion condition is not satisﬁed then reactivity has no inﬂuence on eﬃciency nor
on the distribution.
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ﬁnding does not depend on our speciﬁc example and it does not depend on what
we assume about competition or collaboration.
By contrast the tax rate that maximises welfare for the maximum b does
depend on the speciﬁc example and on the competitiveness of choices at each
of the the two stages. Figure 5 plots the highest optimal tax rate depending
on the reactivity of the audit rule and the particular assumption on collusion
for the parameter values from above. We consider the tax rate as optimal
if it maximises the surplus given the parameters and the form of competition.
Observe that given our parameter values a tax rate below 0.125 leads to truthful
proﬁt declarations in all three scenarios. Tax rates between zero and 0.125 yield
the same surplus in all scenarios. In Figure 5 we only consider the highest
optimal tax rate, which is the one that yields the highest revenue among those
that maximise surplus.
In all three scenarios under a ﬁxed rule (b = 0) a tax rate of 0.125 (or
below) is optimal, as a ﬁxed rule has no eﬀect on allocative eﬃciency in the
goods market. Therefore, welfare is maximised, when the wasted resources for
covering evasion is minimised. The optimal tax rate then should prevent evasion.
Now turn to a relative rule. The only scenario where the relative rule has no
positive inﬂuence on the welfare created in the goods market is when there is
collusion at the production stage. Consequently, the optimal tax rate in the
presence of cartels should again minimise the wasted resources from evasion.
Independent of the reactivity of the rule a tax rate of or below 0.125 is optimal
here, since then evasion does not occur.
In the case of collusion at the declaration stage there is a positive eﬀect of the
relative rule on production quantities. This eﬀect is the stronger the more reac-
tive the rule and the higher the tax rate. The trade-oﬀ between the additional
waste from increased evasion caused by a higher tax rate and the increased al-
locative eﬃciency in the goods market yields an increasing relationship between
the reactivity of the rule and the optimal tax rate.
If ﬁrms collude neither on the declaration stage nor on the production stage
then a more reactive rule does not only increase welfare in the goods market but
also ceteris paribus decreases evasion and waste. It follows that the waste does
not increase as rapidly with the tax rate as under collusion at the declaration
stage. This implies that the optimal tax rate is higher and increases more
strongly with the reactivity of the rule when competition rules on both stages.
To summarise our insights from the welfare simulations, we conclude that a
relative audit rule has widespread advantages over a ﬁxed rule. Furthermore, a
more reactive rule is usually preferred, as it leads to welfare gains.
What are the implications for tax-enforcement policy of a change in compet-
itiveness of the industry? As long as ﬁrms do not collude in the goods market,
a higher reactivity allows for higher tax rates without damaging welfare. So,
increasing the reactivity has another desirable eﬀect for governments.
On the other hand it might be argued that conventional welfare analysis
reveals a feature of the model that should be considered slightly unpleasant.
Typically; if one assumes that ﬁrms are essentially identical, it is optimal to
spend all the audit resources on the ﬁrm that reports the lowest proﬁt (b→∞ ).
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Figure 5: Optimal tax rates for diﬀerent scenarios
It might be thought that this somewhat extreme position is like the old question
about severity of punishment versus probability of detection as a deterrent to a
rational tax evader (because increasing the ﬁne appears to have no resource cost
whereas increasing the detection probability does, it appears to be optimal to
require the death penalty for the slightest amount of tax evasion (Kolm, 1973,
Cowell, 1989). However, the analogy is not appropriate. If there are errors
in information or in administration then the Death to Tax Evaders policy
produces awful outcomes for those who are innocent; but in our model such
errors may just mean that the tax authority is focusing resources on small fry
and letting some big corporate evaders oﬀ the hook. But the innocent are not
suﬀering and no agent is faced with a threat of inﬁnite penalty.
These points illustrate the limitations of the conventional individualistic wel-
fare approach in the present case. Because we are not dealing with distribu-
tional outcomes for individual persons conventional welfare-based approaches to
inequality are not applicable. Nevertheless it still makes sense to discuss fairness
or equity issues in terms of diﬀerences in outcome (net proﬁts) and diﬀerences
in treatment arising from the audit rule. What underlies this is the ﬁrst form of
uncertainty described in section 2; what can make it seem unfair are the second
and third forms of uncertainty: external shocks make like entities appear unalike
and may provide the basis for a relatively favoured ﬁrm to exploit the relative
audit rule to its own advantage. Concern for this unfairness of treatment will
impose a limit on the optimal choice of b.
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7 Conclusions
This paper has shown that the design of a tax authority's audit policy can have
important eﬀects on production decisions by ﬁrms. The nature of those eﬀects
depends on whether ﬁrms compete or collude. Accordingly an appropriately
designed audit policy may not only achieve greater compliance and higher net
revenue for given output and resources spent on audit but may also have other
eﬀects that would be normally be considered desirable in a wider economic
context. By a smart design of the audit policy the authorities can create an
informational externality that partially oﬀsets the informational advantages of
industry insiders. Since decisions in the product market are taken in the light
of the eventual outcome of net after-tax expected proﬁts the audit policy can
create a linkage to output decisions: speciﬁcally it may be possible to nudge
ﬁrms in the direction of greater eﬃciency.
We have shown that, if ﬁrms are essentially similar then it pays the authority
maximise reactivity: to focus its audit resources on the ﬁrm making the lower
declaration, even though non-compliance may be more widespread. Depending
on whether there is competition or collusion in the product market then not
only does high reactivity pay the tax authority in the narrow sense, it also
enhances economic welfare.
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Appendix
This appendix provides the proofs of propositions in the main text.
Proposition 1: Proof.
The ﬁrst-order condition for optimal declarations are
∂
∂di
EUi(di, dj ,Πi,Πj) = 0, ∀i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j
which implies
d∗i (dj) =
f (a+ bdj)− t+ (2 + bf) Πi
2 (1 + bf)
.
Best responses are linear with a slope smaller than 1, which ensures uniqueness
of an interior declaration equilibrium for any admissible pair of gross proﬁts.
Solving for the optimal interior declaration we get:
d∗i =
af − t
2b+ f
+
2(1 + bf)
2 + 3bf
Πi +
bf
2 + 3bf
Πj . (18)
As ﬁrms are ex-ante identical we can use symmetry (i.e. Πj = Πi) on the
quantity stage. The equilibrium declaration becomes
d∗i =
af − t
2b+ f
+ Πi,
which implies that an interior solution requires t > af . The amount of tax
evaded is
t (Πi − d∗i ) =
t (t− af)
2 + bf
.
Taking the derivative with respect to b gives the desired negative eﬀect of b on
the taxes evaded:
d
db
t (Πi − d∗i ) = ft
[
af − t
(2 + bf)
2
]
< 0. (19)
Proposition 2: Proof. Take the ﬁrst order condition for the optimal quantity
at the gross proﬁt maximum of ﬁrm i (i.e. ∂Πi/∂qi = 0):
∂
∂qi
EUi
∣∣∣∣
∂Πi/∂qi=0
=
∂Πj
∂qi
[
bf (Πi − d∗i )
(
∂d∗i
∂Πj
− ∂d
∗
j
∂Πj
)
− t ∂d
∗
i
∂Πj
]
. (20)
From (18) we know that
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0 <
∂d∗i
∂Πj
=
bf
2 + 3bf
<
∂d∗j
∂Πj
=
2(1 + bf)
2 + 3bf
,
which together with ∂Πj/∂qi < 0 implies that
∂
∂qi
EUi
∣∣∣∣
∂Πi/∂qi=0
{
= 0 if b = 0
> 0 if b > 0
Consequently, under b = 0 the duopolists set ∂Πi/∂q
∗
i = 0, which yields the
Cournot solution. Under a relative rule a duopolist's optimal quantity given
the quantity produced by the opponent is greater than Cournot best-response
to the opponent's quantity, i.e. ∂Πi/∂q
∗
i < 0. Exploiting symmetry we know
that the equilibrium quantity lies on the 45-degree in the qi, qj space. Since the
best-response quantity is greater than the Cournot best response quantity for
any quantity of the opponent, the best-response function crosses the 45-degree
line on a point above and to the right of the Cournot solution.
Proposition 3: Proof. Joint proﬁt maximisation on the declaration stage
leads to declarations such that
(d∗1, d
∗
2) = arg max
d1,d2
[EU1(d1, d2,Π1,Π2) + EU2(d2, d1,Π2,Π1)] .
Taking ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to d1 and d2 and solving gives
d∗i =
(1 + 2bf) (af − t) + (2 + 3bf) Πi + bfΠj
2 + 4bf
∀i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j (21)
Invoking symmetry on the production stage (i.e. Πi = Πj) the optimal decla-
ration under collusion at the declaration stage becomes
d∗i =
af − t
2
−Πi.
The evaded tax per ﬁrm is
t (Πi − d∗i ) =
t (t− af)
2
,
which does not depend on b.
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Proposition 4: Proof. Take the ﬁrst-order condition for ﬁrm i's quantity
and evaluate it at its Cournot best-response
∂
∂qi
EUi
∣∣∣∣
∂Πi/∂qi=0
=
∂Πj
∂qi
[
bf (Πi − d∗i )
(
∂d∗i
∂Πj
− ∂d
∗
j
∂Πj
)
− t ∂d
∗
i
∂Πj
]
,
which is the same as (20). However, the reaction of the optimal declarations to
changes in the gross proﬁts are diﬀerent in the case of collusion. They can be
taken from the jointly optimal declarations in (21):
0 <
∂d∗i
∂Πj
=
bf
2 + 4bf
<
∂d∗j
∂Πj
=
2 + 3bf
2 + 4bf
.
By the same logic as in the proof of Proposition 2 we have
∂
∂qi
EUi
∣∣∣∣
∂Πi/∂qi=0
{
= 0 if b = 0
> 0 if b > 0
and consequently equilibrium quantities are greater than the Cournot quantity
if b > 0.
Proposition 6: Proof. Anticipating this the two ﬁrms will know that they
both will declare the same proﬁt, which means that they will end up audit
probability a. We can write the joint proﬁt as
EΠi(d
∗(Q), Q) + EΠj(d∗(Q), Q)
= 2
[
Π(Q)− td∗(Q)− af (Π(Q)− d∗(Q))− (Π(Q)− d∗(Q))2
]
,
where Π(Q) is one ﬁrm's proﬁt for total output Q = 2q. Taking the ﬁrst-order
condition and dividing by two gives
∂Π
∂Q
[1− af − 2 (Π(Q)− d∗(Q))]− (t− af − 2 (Π(Q)− d∗(Q))) ∂d
∗
∂Q
= 0. (22)
Now observe that according to the second-stage declarations form (18)
∂d∗
∂Q
=
2(1 + bf)
2 + 3bf
∂Π
∂Q
+
bf
2 + 3bf
∂Π
∂Q
=
∂Π
∂Q
,
which can be used to write (22) as
∂Π
∂Q
[1− t] = 0,
which implies that the joint monopoly quantity is chosen (i.e. where ∂Π/∂Q =
0).
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